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COMMENTARIES
FAIRNESS-THE BROADCASTER'S
HIPPOCRATIC OATH
Charles D. Ferris*
and James A. Kirkland **
Sixteen years ago, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Fairness
Doctrine' in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.2 Over forty years ago, the
Court held that public interest regulation of broadcasters is fully consistent
with the first amendment.' Both of these venerable holdings, though con-
sistently reaffirmed by the Court,' are now under concerted attack by broad-
casters and those who.have taken up their cause.5 The volume and vigor of
these attacks, however, exceed their merit. The case for the Fairness Doc-
trine and the similar provisions affecting political broadcasting6 is stronger
now than it was when the Supreme Court decided Red Lion.
The power of television broadcasters in providing the public with informa-
tion on political, social, and cultural issues and current events is indisputa-
* Charles D. Ferris, Esq., is a member of the law firm of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., Washington, D.C. and Boston, Massachusetts. He was Chairman of
the Federal Communications Commission from 1977-81.
** James A. Kirkland, Esq., A.B., Georgetown, 1981; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984.
Mr. Kirkland is an associate in the Washington office of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky
and Popeo, P.C.
1. For an explanation of the "Fairness Doctrine," see infra notes 8-19 and accompanying
text.
2. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
4. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116 n.ll, 3117 n.12 (1984);
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-03
(1973).
5. These include members of Congress, see, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S 108 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
1985) (introduction of S. 22, "First Amendment Clarification Act of 1985" by Senator
Proxmire); Hearings on Freedom of Expression Act of 1983, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), as well as the FCC itself, see General
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcasters, Notice of Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (1984).
6. The Commission has also adopted rules that guarantee fairness in coverage of political
campaigns. The most important rules require that broadcasters afford equal opportunities to
political candidates, and that they provide reasonable access to candidates for federal office.
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ble.7 Broadcasting now outdistances other media of communication by a
wide margin. This growth in power parallels the recent growth of independ-
ent political groups, known as political action committees (PACs). PACs
are presently willing and able to devote their immense resources to media
campaigns to advocate their limited political agendas. As a result, the risk
that broadcasters and wealthy interests could monopolize our national dia-
logue, recognized in Red Lion, looms larger than ever before.
Critics of the fairness rules often overlook the fact that broadcasters pos-
sess this power not by their own efforts, but because the government has
granted them the privilege of using a portion of the spectrum as trustees for
the public. Without government allocation of the spectrum, no one could
broadcast effectively, as the chaotic experience in the infancy of radio
demonstrated. Requiring broadcasters to air diverse views on important is-
sues, and provide access opportunities for political candidates, is the quid
pro quo our society expects for the broadcaster's use of the public airways.
These requirements, however, are no greater than the requirements imposed
by the canons of journalistic ethics. The fairness rules are thus, quite simply,
the Hippocratic Oath of broadcasters. Just as doctors are expected respon-
sibly to exercise their power over life and death, so too are broadcasters
expected responsibly to exercise their power in our national dialogue. This
article will defend the Fairness Doctrine as a sensible accommodation of the
first amendment rights of broadcasters, and the right of the public both to
present its various viewpoints and to receive an evenhanded presentation of
important issues.
I. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE POLITICAL BROADCASTING
RULES
A. The Fairness Doctrine
The Fairness Doctrine imposes two obligations upon broadcast licensees.
First, a broadcaster must devote a "reasonable percentage" of his broadcast
time to controversial issues of public importance.' This obligation is rarely a
7. For example, one recent study showed that 65% of the population relies primarily
upon television for news, up from 51% in 1959. ROPER ORGANIZATION, TRENDS IN ATTi-
TUDES TOWARDS TELEVISION AND OTHER MEDIA: A TWENTY-FOUR YEAR REVIEW 10- 11
(1984) [hereinafter cited as ROPER STUDY]. See infra discussion accompanying notes 38-49.
8. In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Fairness Report]. This obligation has venerable roots. See Great Lakes Broadcasting
Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 557 (1941).
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source of controversy9 and the Commission has largely deferred to the "rea-
sonable good faith judgment" of licensees in applying this standard."° The
second part of the Fairness Doctrine requires broadcasters to provide a rea-
sonably balanced picture of controversial issues, whether presented through
paid advertising or through regular programming." Although a broad-
caster need not present all views within a single program, programming
must be balanced overall. 2 Where a broadcaster airs one side of a contro-
versial issue and cannot find a paying sponsor to express contrasting views,
the Fairness Doctrine requires him either to air the contrasting views himself
or to provide free air time for proponents of those views.13 The broadcaster
is allowed wide discretion in determining how these various obligations are
met, and will only be questioned where his efforts are not in good faith."4
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Fairness Doctrine was upheld
despite a vigorous statutory and constitutional challenge.' 5 After finding
ample statutory basis for the Fairness Doctrine, a unanimous Court rejected
the broadcasters' contention that the fairness rules violated their first amend-
ment rights.' 6 The Court reasoned that, in the context of broadcasting,
where "only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope
to communicate. . . if intelligible communication is to be had. . . it is idle
to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish."' 7 Instead, the
Court found the public's interest in a free marketplace of ideas to be more
compelling than the first amendment rights of broadcasters:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broad-
casters, which is paramount.18
The Court's analysis in Red Lion has been consistently reaffirmed through-
9. In at least one case, however, the Commission has required a broadcaster to cover a
particular issue. See Complaint of Rep. Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
10. Fairness Report, supra note 8, at 11.
11. Id. at 7.
12. See generally id. at 1-7.
13. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963).
14. Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standard
of the Communications Act, 74 F.C.C.2d 163, 171 (1979); Yellow Freight Sys., 73 F.C.C.2d
741, 749 (1979). See Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1008-09 (D.C. Cir.
1976); see also infra text accompanying notes 60-66.
15. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
16. Id. at 388.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 390.
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out the years.' 9
B. The Political Broadcasting Rules
The political broadcasting rules consist of two basic provisions. The first
provision requires that broadcasters provide legally qualified candidates for
federal office with "reasonable access" to their broadcasting facilities.2" The
second rule, commonly referred to as the "equal time" rule, requires a
broadcaster who has allowed a candidate to "use"'" his facilities, to provide
an opposing candidate with an equal opportunity to broadcast his or her
views.22 However, if a broadcaster sells time to a candidate, he need only
offer to sell time to the candidate's opponent. Under the equal time rules,
free time need not be offered.
The purpose of the equal opportunities rule is straight-forward: to pre-
vent a broadcaster from using his facilities to promote the candidacy of any
one particular person.23 This goal is accomplished with negligible interfer-
ence with a broadcaster's editorial judgment by exempting all traditional
news coverage from the equal opportunities rule.24 As with the Fairness
Doctrine, the Commission shows great deference to the good faith judg-
ments of a broadcaster in determining how to comply with these
requirements.
In 1981, the Supreme Court upheld the requirement of "reasonable ac-
cess" to broadcasting facilities by legally qualified federal candidates in CBS
19. See supra note 4.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982). The FCC has also determined that licensees must offer
reasonable amounts of time to state and local candidates under the general public interest
standard. Public Notice: Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209,
2286-87 (1978).
21. Equal opportunity applies only when the broadcast is a "use"-an identifiable appear-
ance by the candidate by voice or picture. Thus, this provision does not apply to broadcasts on
the candidate's behalf where he does not appear. See, e.g., Public Notice: Use of Broadcast
Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 838 (1970). In addition, news
coverage is generally exempted. See infra note 24.
22. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). See, e.g., Public Notice: Use of Broadcast Facilities by
Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 869 (1970); Major General Harry Johnson, 40
F.C.C. 323 (1961); E.A. Stephens, 11 F.C.C. 61 (1945).
23. Carter/Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 81 F.C.C.2d 409, 415 (1980).
24. A broadcaster is under no duty to provide equal opportunity if a candidate appears in
a bona fide newscast, news interview, news documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of a news
event. Public Notice: Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2245-
57.
25. See, e.g., Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications
Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1089 (1978) ("We continue to believe that the best method for achiev-
ing a balance between the desires of candidates for air time and the commitments of licensees
to the broadcast of other types of programming is to rely on the reasonable, good faith discre-
tion of individual licensees."); Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602, 604 (1973).
[Vol. 34:605
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v. FCC.26 The Court held that section 312(a)(7) created a "special right of
access" for federal candidates, not merely a general duty to air candidates'
views.2 ' Echoing Red Lion, the Court stated that "it is the right of the pub-
lic to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here."' 2' Further, the Court noted
that the reasonable access provision "makes a significant contribution to
freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present...
information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic pro-
cess," 29 and concluded that
[s]ection 312(a)(7) represents an effort by Congress to assure that
an important resource-the airwaves-will be used in the public
interest. We hold that the statutory right of access, as defined by
the Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the
First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and
broadcasters.3 °
This same analysis should apply equally to the other political broadcasting
rules.
II. THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCASTERS
Both the Red Lion and CBS cases recognize that broadcasters have unique
responsibilities to serve the public interest. Broadcasters are " 'public trust-
ees' charged with the duty of fairly and impartially informing the public
audience."" The trustee concept, with its concomitant responsibilities,
dates back to the origins of radio. 32 The early experience with radio showed
26. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
27. Id. at 379-82.
28. Id. at 395 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
29. CBS, 453 U.S. at 396.
30. Id. at 397.
31. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. at 117.
32. The requirement that broadcasters be regulated in the "public interest, convenience
and necessity" was included in the original statute affecting broadcasting, the Radio Act of
1927. See ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. Herbert Hoover, in 1924, argued that broadcasters should
be public trustees:
Radio Communication is not to be considered as merely a business carried on for
private gain, for private advertisement, or for entertainment of the curious. It is a
public concern impressed with the public trust and is to be considered primarily from
the standpoint of public interest to the same extent and upon the basis of the same
general principles as our other public utilities.
Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1924). In 1930, the Federal Radio Commission stated that
[although] [t]he conscience and judgment of a station's management are necessarily
personal, . . . the station itself must be operated as if owned by the public. . . . It is
as if people of a community should own a station and turn it over to the best man in
1985]
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that with unfettered competition for use of the airwaves, no one could effec-
tively broadcast; all were drowned out.33 As a result, the broadcasting in-
dustry unanimously demanded government allocation of the public
airwaves.34 In responding to the demands of the broadcasters, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission), and its predecessor,
the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), allocated the spectrum to a limited
number of applicants.35 Congress wisely chose the "public interest" as the
criterion for selection of those who would receive this valuable privilege.
Significantly, the FRC, in one of the first actions under the public interest
standard, required broadcasters to devote a reasonable amount of time to
coverage of issues of public importance. 36
Requiring broadcast licensees to inform the public in return for the grant
of a valuable privilege was, and still is, a fair bargain. Indeed, the dramatic
increase in the power of broadcasters in modem times makes the case for the
fairness rules all the more compelling. Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover recognized the risk of domination of the broadcast medium by a few
voices even prior to the passage of the Radio Act of 1927. He testified that
''we can not allow any single person or group to place themselves in [a]
position where they can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to
the public.",
3 7
Sixty years later, the domination of broadcasting by the three television
networks is an economic fact of life. The networks have the resources to
take advantage of the pronounced economies of scale in the development
and distribution of programming,3" which are particularly pronounced in
sight with this injunction: 'Manage this station in our interest.'. .. The standing of
every station is determined by that conception.
In re Schaeffer Radio Co. (1930), reprinted in part in The Federal Radio Commission and the
Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, 11 FED. COMM. B.J. 5, 14 (1950).
33. The Navy reported to the Senate that
[c]alls of distress from vessels in peril on the sea go unheeded or are drowned out
in the etheric bedlam produced by numerous stations all trying to compete at
once. . . .It is not putting the case too strongly to state that the situation is intoler-
able, and is continually growing worse.
S. REP. No. 659, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1910). See also E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY, & 0.
TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 10-16 (3d ed. 1982).
34. Herbert Hoover commented in 1924 that he thought broadcasting was "probably the
only industry of the United States that is unanimously in favor of having itself regulated."
quoted in G. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF TELEVISION AND RADIO
126 (3d ed. 1976).
35. See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376.
36. See supra note 8; see also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. at 117.
37. Hearings on H.R. 2357 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisher-
ies, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
38. B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 18 (1975); II NETWORK IN-
QUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, NEW TELEVISION NET-
[Vol. 34:605
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the area of news programming. 39 As a consequence, the networks supply
the vast majority of the programming to their affiliates.'
The advent of new technologies capable of transmitting video program-
ming has not reduced the dominance of the networks. As one network exec-
utive recently observed, the development of these technologies merely
"underscore[s] the singular role of network television-which remains our
only true mass medium-as the only shared experience that crosses over all
the differences that characterize this vast and varied nation."'" Cable televi-
sion and the other new video outlets cited by critics of broadcast regulation
are insignificant by comparison. The "video cornucopia" envisioned by
these critics is, indeed, many years away.
Exotic technologies such as Multipoint Distribution Systems and Satellite
Master Antenna Television together presently reach less than one percent of
the population.42 Even cable television only reaches slightly more than one-
third of all households4 3 while a majority of the twenty largest United States
cities remain unwired for cable.' More importantly, cable television today
is primarily a new means of delivering programming. Cable has not yet be-
come a sufficiently important source of original and diverse programming to
reduce the American public's dependence on the three commercial networks
for their news and information. Instead, today's cable systems are depen-
dent upon the networks for their livelihood. Cable television systems in
many communities carry as many as six network-affiliated stations,45 whose
programs necessarily overlap. Any other programming carried by cable and
other systems is generally sports or movies, not informational programming.
Even the emergence of a cable offering such as the Cable News Network
does not, by itself, significantly affect the preeminent position of the
networks.46
WORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 219-20 (October 1980); R.
NOLL, M. PECK, & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 59
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC ASPECTS].
39. ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 38, at 69.
40. Approximately three quarters of evening prime time programming originates with the
networks. See ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 38, at 15.
41. Speech by John Severino, ABC, to Arizona Broadcasters Ass'n, Nov. 11, 1984, at 2
(copy on file with the authors).
42. Comments of Media Access Project, General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad-
casters, Docket No. 84-282, at 72-73 (filed Sept. 6, 1984).
43. See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 5, at 20,324.
44. CHANNELS 1984 FIELD GUIDE TO THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA 26 (1984).
45. See Amendment of Part 76 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations sections 76.59-
76.63 with Respect to "Saturated" Cable Television Systems, 66 F.C.C.2d 710, 713 (1977).
46. It may of course be that certain of these new media, such as cable television, do not
need the full panoply of fairness doctrine protections, given their lack of dominance and the
required access channels they must offer under the Cable Communications and Policy Act of
1985]
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The dominance of television in our national dialogue thus continues un-
abated. Recent studies of how the population receives its news show clearly
the magnitude of this dominance. The vast majority of the population de-
pends primarily upon traditional television for news,47 while over forty per-
cent of the population relies exclusively on television for news.48 Studies
also indicate that television is the main source of information on national
political campaigns and issues.49
The Fairness Doctrine simply requires that television, as the dominant
means of mass communication, cover public issues and candidates, and
cover them in a fair and balanced fashion. These requirements are all the
more important in light of the recent rise of independent political groups,
known as political action committees or PACs.5" These organizations have
at their disposal great financial resources for advocacy of their limited inter-
ests. The number of PACs has mushroomed,51 as have their total expendi-
tures in the political arena.
52
The fairness and political broadcasting rules limit the risk that such
wealthy special interest groups will drown out those groups with less finan-
cial resources. Under the Fairness Doctrine, sale of time to a PAC triggers a
broadcaster's obligation to air contrasting views by including opposing view-
points in a program, by selling advertising time to opposing groups, or by
1984. For a discussion of the peculiar concerns of cable under the Fairness Doctrine, see, e.g.,
FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 26, 472 (1983). This, however, does not
diminish the need for the doctrine in the dominant broadcast media.
47. One recent study showed that 65% of the population mentioned television as the
source of most of their news, up from 51% in 1959. By contrast, only 44% mentioned news-
papers. ROPER STUDY, supra note 7, at 10-11. See also G. GERBNER & W. SIGNORELLI, The
World of Television News in TELEVISION NETWORK NEWS 189 (W. Adams, ed., 1978); A.
REEL, THE NETWORKS 13-15 (1979).
48. ROPER STUDY, supra note 7, at 12.
49. One study found that 59% of the public believed that television provided the "clearest
understanding of candidates and issues in national elections," R. BOWER, TELEVISION AND
THE PUBLIC 100 (1973), while another found that a substantial percentage of the population
follows national political issues only through television, M. ROBINSON, American Political Le-
gitimacy in the Era of Electronic Journalism, in TELEVISION AS A SOCIAL FORCE (D. Carter,
ed., 1975).
50. See generally Ferris & Ballard, Independent Political Action Groups, New Life for the
Fairness Doctrine, 36 VAND. L. REV. 929, 929-31 (1983).
51. The number of PACs has increased from 2,901 in 1981 (see 10 Campaign Practices
Reports, No. 1, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1983)) to 3,800 in 1984 (see 11 Campaign Practices Reports, No.
18, at 8 (Sept. 24, 1984)).
52. Estimated expenditures on contributions to congressional campaigns totalled $120
million in the 1983-84 election cycle, up from $83 million in the 1981-82 cycle. 11 Campaign
Practices Reports, No. 31, at 1, 2 (Oct. 31, 1984).
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offering free time to opposing groups.53 In addition, the Commission has
held that where broadcasters sell time to supporters of one candidate to air,
for example, negative advertisements against an opposing candidate, the sup-
porters of the opposing candidate must be afforded an equal opportunity to
purchase time to air their views.54 Independent political action committees
actually supporting a particular candidate are thus prevented from circum-
venting the rules requiring broadcasters to afford equivalent opportunities to
opposing political candidates. As previously stated, the FCC recently reaf-
firmed the validity of this doctrine, denying efforts by CBS and others to
overturn it.
55
The Fairness Doctrine and political broadcasting rules thus temper the
power of broadcasters by requiring them to exercise their power responsibly.
The rules prevent a single-minded pursuit of profit that could lead broad-
casters to ignore important and controversial issues or viewpoints 56 by pro-
viding airtime only to wealthy candidates or to the highest bidders for
advertising time. These responsibilities, which critics of the fairness rules
claim to be so onerous, are no greater than those required by journalistic
ethics and sound journalistic practice. For instance, Group W, owner of
several broadcast stations, made this point succinctly in comments to the
FCC: "The Fairness Doctrine . . . has never caused Group W to treat is-
sues in any manner other than it would have done based on reasons of good
journalistic practice."5 7 Similarly, the Code of Ethics, Standards and Prac-
tices of the National Broadcast Editorial Association provides that "it is the
duty and the obligation of every radio and television station to present edito-
rials on issues of public significance in order to serve the needs and interests
of the community.",58 One can only wonder why broadcasters are so intent
on repealing standards that simply require ethical conduct.
53. See Ferris & Ballard supra note 50, at 942-44. See also, e.g., Cullman Broadcasting
Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
54. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
55. See In re Request of CBS, 95 F.C.C.2d 1152 (1983) (Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der); National Conservative Political Action Committee, 89 F.C.C.2d 626 (1982).
56. Powerful economic incentives lead broadcasters to avoid controversy. See infra note
71 and accompanying text.
57. Comments of Group W, General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licen-
sees, Docket No. 84-282, at 6 (Sept. 3, 1984).
58. NATIONAL BROADCAST EDITORIAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS, STANDARDS
AND PRACTICES. Similarly, the CANADIAN DAILY NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1977) provides that "fairness requires a balanced presentation of
the relevant facts in a news report, and of all substantial opinions in a matter of controversy. It
precludes distortion of meaning by over- or under-emphasis, or by placing facts or quotations
out of context." Additionally, the AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS CODE
OF ETHICS states that "every effort must be made to assure that the news content is accurate,
free from bias and in context, and that all sides are presented fairly."
1985]
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The rules, however, do more than restate accepted journalistic ethics.
They also insulate broadcast journalists from external pressures and allow
them to act as their conscience dictates. When pressured by established
powers or advertisers in a community to suppress coverage of a controversial
political issue or to support their particular points of view, a broadcaster can
simply point to the obligations imposed by the Fairness Doctrine.5 9
The fairness rules provide for broadcaster responsibility by setting broad
standards of conduct that leave broadcasters with great editorial freedom in
day-to-day coverage of the news. As a matter of policy, the FCC has shown
great deference to the good faith judgments of broadcasters in meeting their
obligations under the Fairness Doctrine.' The latitude allowed broadcast-
ers is so great that the FCC will question a broadcaster only when the "sta-
tion's position is so 'off the wall' that no reasonable person could accept
it.''6I For example, in 1980, the FCC requested only twenty-eight broadcast-
ers to respond to Fairness Doctrine and political broadcasting complaints,
even though the Commission received an estimated 20,000 complaints in
all.62 A grand total of six cases were decided against the station involved.63
In cases such as these, where coverage is found inadequate, the remedy,
however, is not "censorship." Rather, the broadcaster is simply advised to
meet its fairness obligations through additional programming.64
The Commission's deference to broadcasters in this area is no accident.
The courts have carefully protected the rights of broadcasters, and have
scrutinized the FCC's decisions more closely than those of other regulatory
agencies.65 In addition, the courts have held that the FCC's deferential poli-
59. As one witness with experience in broadcasting testified at recent Senate hearings:
More dangerous [than the Fairness Doctrine], in my opinion, is the chilling effect
that social and economic pressures exert against our media. These are daily, con-
stant, and sometimes very troublesome pressures. Against these pressures, a doctrine
that requires that all sides be covered fairly is a welcome protection for a news direc-
tor intent upon living up to the highest standards of his profession. That perhaps
explains why the working journalist in the newsroom is so much more sanguine
about the Fairness Doctrine than the executive in the front office.
Freedom of Expression Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1917 Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1984) (statement of Roy M.
Fisher) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of Expression Act Hearings].
60. See supra notes 9-10, 12-14 and accompanying text.
61. F. ROWAN, infra note 91, at 65.
62. Id. at 51.
63. Id. Similar percentages were found in another study of an earlier period. See S. SIM-
MONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 210-11 (1978).
64. See American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 447
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); In re Applicability of Fairness Doctrine in
the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
65. See, e.g., Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
[Vol. 34:605
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cies are required in light of the first amendment interests of broadcasters.66
Fears that FCC regulation could escalate to "censorship" are, therefore,
clearly unfounded.
Given the Commission's deferential policies and the actual reality of en-
forcement, broadcasters' claims that the fairness rules "chill" or otherwise
intrude upon editorial discretion do not ring true.67 Indeed, broadcasters
have produced no evidence of a chilling effect. In 1974, after two years of
study consuming thousands of staff hours, the FCC concluded that there
was "no credible evidence of a chilling effect.",68 Again, in 1984, the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters, presumably after an exhaustive search,
could produce only a few instances of a supposed chilling effect. 69 Further-
more, the "chill" argument ignores the first part of the Fairness Doctrine,
which requires broadcasters to devote a reasonable amount of time to impor-
tant issues. 70 By saying they are "chilled," broadcasters, in effect, admit
noncompliance with this part of the doctrine. It is also strange that critics of
the fairness rules believe that a pattern of violations of one part of the rules is
a good argument for repeal of all of the fairness rules. In any event, it is
more probable that if any chilling effect is present, it results from economic
incentives and not from the minimal standards of fairness imposed by the
Fairness Doctrine. The simple fact is that coverage of controversial issues is
not as profitable as airing "sitcoms" or blooper shows, 7' and advertisers are
reluctant to support controversial programming.72 If anything, the Fairness
Doctrine and political broadcasting rules provide an antidote to this chilling
effect.
Polsby, Candidate Access to the Air: The Uncertain Future of Broadcaster Discretion, 1981
Sup. Cr. REV. 223, 244.
66. See Straus Communications, 530 F.2d at 1011.
67. Cf Address by William J. Brennan, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979) (criticizing press
for overreaction to defeats in Burger Court).
68. Fairness Report, supra note 8, at 8. The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
in Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
69. The NAB claimed to have documented 45 examples of a "chilling effect." See Com-
ments of National Association of Broadcasters, General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of
Broadcast Licensees, Docket No. 84-282. Even if all of these examples were valid, considering
that the examples covered a 16 year period, and that there are aproximately 10,000 broadcast
licensees, this record hardly would be compelling. Even these few examples, however, have
been extensively criticized. See Reply Comments of the Media Access Project, Docket No. 84-
282, at 27-37 (Nov. 8, 1984).
70. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. Similarly, arguments that the political
broadcast rules "chill" coverage of political races ignore the "reasonable access" provisions of
the political broadcasting laws.
71. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 38, at 69.
72. See, e.g., Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J.
213, 230 n.58.
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The fairness rules thus provide our society with a sensible accommodation
of conflicting rights and values. The rules vindicate the public interest in
information on issues and candidates, and in a fair presentation of this infor-
mation, by setting broad standards of acceptable conduct. Within these
guidelines, editors have broad discretion in selecting material without fear of
government reprisal or censorship. If a broadcaster is unsure of his responsi-
bilities, he or she can simply provide for more air time on a particular issue.
The alternatives to these rules are far worse. Our democracy and Consti-
tution are founded on the belief that those with great power must be held
accountable for their actions. This attitude pervades our society, and broad-
casters would be naive to think that it does not extend to them as well. The
fairness rules are a minimally intrusive means of enforcing some level of
broadcaster accountability. Repeal of these rules, on the other hand, would
feed popular perceptions of the unchecked power of the press.7 3 Repeal
would also run counter to the high value the public places on fairness. In-
deed, a recent survey of public opinion indicated that by a wide margin,
people believe that freedom of expression means that all views on important
issues should be available,74 not freedom of the institutional press from regu-
lation. The fairness rules ensure that these public expectations are met.
Without the rules, broadcasters increasingly would be vulnerable to public
suspicion of a hidden agenda or some secret bias.75
Such public sentiment in support of fairness cannot be ignored. Distrust
and suspicion of broadcasting will manifest itself one way or another, most
likely in ways far more harmful to the media than the fairness rules. As
73. See, e.g., Bollinger, The Press and the Public Interest: An Essay on the Relationship
Between Social Behavior and the Language of First Amendment Theory, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1447, 1454-55 (1984).
74. PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION, THE SPEAKER AND THE LISTENER: A PUBLIC PER-
SPECTIVE ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 23-30, 38 (1980) (funded by John & Mary Markle
Foundation). A more recent study of public attitudes towards the press commissioned by the
American Society of Newspaper Editors found that overwhelming majorities favored balanced
coverage of candidates for public office. MORI RESEARCH, INC., NEWSPAPER CREDIBILITY:
BUILDING READER TRUST 31 (April 1985) [hereinafter cited as ASNE Study] (91% of those
surveyed believe television should give equal time to political candidates).
75. The public currently perceives television as the most reliable and objective news me-
dium. See ROPER STUDY, supra note 7, at 6; R. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC 100
(1973). Suspicions that the institutional media favor certain political beliefs, however, are
common. The recent controversy over Senator Jesse Helms' plans to take over CBS provides
but one example. See CBS Suit Accuses Conservative Group of False Proxy Solicitations, COM-
MUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 19, 1985, at 3-4. See generally B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 55-66 (1976). The ASNE Study found that "three-fourths of all
adults have some problem with the credibility of the media," while one-fifth "deeply distrust
their news media." ASNE Study, supra note 74, at 13.
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Fred Friendly, former president of CBS, observed in the context of the West-
moreland libel case:
It is a basic law of physics and journalism that to create a pres-
sure-cooker climate without the safety valve is to ensure a destruc-
tive force inexorably destined to explode. Freedom of the press is a
protection, a safety valve, for all citizens, not just those lucky
enough or rich enough to control the levers of communication
power.76
Juries already return most libel verdicts against the media, 77 often for mil-
lions of dollars. The burdens imposed by the Fairness Doctrine are minis-
cule compared to the staggering costs of defending libel suits. 78 Worse still,
growing public dissatisfaction may eventually lead to imposition of far more
burdensome governmental regulations, such as mandatory access
requirements.79
76. Friendly, After the Westmoreland Case: How Can the People Talk Back?, Wash. Post,
Feb. 20, 1985, at A21, col. 3.
77. A study by the Libel Defense Resource Center found that juries return 80% of libel
verdicts against the defendant. Kovner, A Response to Remarks of Louis Nizer, 6 COMMUNI-
CATIONS AND THE LAW 59, 61 (1984).
78. The legal fees in the CBS-Westmoreland case have been estimated at between 7 mil-
lion and 9 million dollars. Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1985, at A20. The Washington Post recently
editorialized that
[the Westmoreland libel] case is bound to leave many people wondering if there is not
a reasonable alternative to the draining process of a libel proceeding. Broadly speak-
ing, we think there are two. Public figures must come to an understanding not so
much of their difficulty in winning a libel suit as of the public's interest in robust
inquiry. News organizations have to find it in themselves to be fair and professional
and, when reasonable questions arise, to provide aggrieved parties a reasonable re-
sponse or a reasonable way to respond themselves.
Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1985, at A20, col. 2.
79. One popular groundswell in favor of access has already come and gone. In the early
1970's, following the Red Lion decision, the access movement grew in strength, culminating in
the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d
642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The circuit court held that the first amendment required a right of
access to paid advertising time. Although the appellate court's decision was reversed by the
Supreme Court in CBS v. DNC, renewed popular sentiment, fueled by growing resentment of
the perceived unchecked power and bias of the media, could create pressure for statutory or
constitutional access. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. One commentator has
argued that:
[T]he media represent an emerging new concentration of power akin to the railroads,
trusts, and monopolies of the late-nineteenth century. . . . Bear in mind that, one
hundred years ago, railroads, utilities, and trusts were also claiming the protection of
the Bill of Rights. . . . If the Fourteenth Amendment could mean something differ-
ent in 1938-in recognition of changing circumstances-from what it did in 1888,
then perhaps the First Amendment may undergo a shifting interpretation of its own
to reflect the new status of the communications industry. The media may be forced
into the status of utilities regulated to provide access.
K. PHILLIPS, MEDIACRACY: AMERICAN PARTIES AND POLITICS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FAIRNESS RULES
The Fairness Doctrine and political broadcasting rules embody a delicate
balance of three competing first amendment values: the public's interest in
the free flow of information, the interests of speakers other than media own-
ers in presenting their views to the public, and the editorial freedom of
broadcasters. Critics of the rules nonetheless argue that the rules violate the
first amendment. These critics view the first amendment narrowly, focusing
solely on the supposed right of the broadcaster to be free from governmental
interference. In doing so, they not only ignore other first amendment values,
but also ignore the threat to these values posed by concentration of media
control in the hands of the few. This is a real threat in the context of broad-
casting. Government intervention under the circumstances is not only per-
missible, but truly essential to meaningful freedom of expression. The
Supreme Court recognized this need in no uncertain terms in Associated
Press v. United States:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for
freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First
Amendment should be read as a command that the government
was without power to protect that freedom. . . . That Amend-
ment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition
of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-govern-
mental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that
constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means
freedom for all and not for some.8 °
The fairness rules protect, first and foremost, the public's right of access to
AGE 31 (1975). The ASNE Study of media credibility concluded that "diminished press credi-
bility may be a threat to the special role of the press in American society . . . credibility
ratings were found in the study to be related to people's opinions about press rights and privi-
leges." ASNE Study, supra note 74, at 51.
80. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at
389-90 (the first amendment is intended to create an uninhibited marketplace of ideas and not
to permit a monopolization of that market whether by government or a licensee). Cf.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-88 (1980) (upholding state court inter-
pretation of free speech provisions of state constitution as requiring owners of a shopping
center to open facility to speech by others). The notion that government may act affirmatively
to vindicate first amendment rights is neither new nor novel, and has gained increasing accept-
ance among commentators. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-19, at
676 (1978) ("the right to know ... carries the implication that government, while it may not
close the [marketplace of ideas] may move to correct its defects and regulate its incidental
consequences"). See also, e.g., Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA.
L. REV. 795 (1981); Yackle, Confessions of a Horizontalist: A Dialogue on the First Amend-
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diverse viewpoints.8 1 Red Lion provided one of the Court's strongest pro-
nouncements of the public's right to "receive suitable access to social, polit-
ical, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences." 2 It was, however, by
no means the first. As early as 1923, the Supreme Court recognized that
access to knowledge must be protected." Since then, the Court has vindi-
cated the right of access to diverse ideas in a variety of contexts.8 4 The value
of this access cannot be doubted. Exposure to different and even disturbing
viewpoints helps us to better refine our own views and understand those
around us. As Justice Brennan said of students, "access [to ideas] prepares
[them] for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often conten-
tious society in which they will soon be adult members."8 " The process of
self-government also requires that citizens be fully informed of competing
viewpoints.8 6
The fairness rules also serve first amendment values in a way that is often
overlooked. The rules have created substantial opportunities for expression
by those "who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are
not members of the press."8 7 The political broadcasting rules accomplish
this goal directly by providing candidates with an enforceable right of rea-
sonable access to the airwaves, as well as a right to equal opportunities. 8
Additionally, the Fairness Doctrine indirectly creates similar opportunities
ment, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 541 (1979); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
82. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
83. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (reversing conviction under statute mak-
ing it unlawful to teach foreign languages to young children, in part because the law interfered
with the "opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge").
84. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (limiting school board's
discretion to remove "objectionable" books from school library based on students' right of
voluntary access to new ideas); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-79
(1980) (right of public access to criminal trials); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial free speech permits pharmacist
to advertise price of prescription drugs); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (state law
prohibiting mere personal possession of pornography in one's home interferes with constitu-
tional right to receive information and ideas); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965) (first amendment right to receive Communist literature by mail without government
interference).
85. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
86. James Madison observed that
[a] popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.
9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hert, ed., 1910).
87. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
88. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
for expression by nonmedia speakers. While the doctrine does not require
that a broadcaster provide airtime to individuals or groups in order to meet
its fairness obligations in any particular case, 9 the Commission has recog-
nized that broadcasters should, as one means of complying with fairness ob-
ligations, allow speakers to present their own views directly to the public. 90
Aside from these general statements of policy, the Fairness Doctrine pro-
vides created significant opportunities by providing individuals and commu-
nity groups with leverage in their informal requests to broadcasters for
coverage of opposing views on critical issues.91 Through such discussions,
groups and individuals have obtained free and paid advertising time, as well
as opportunities to appear on news programs and talk shows.92 Without the
Fairness Doctrine, it is doubtful that many broadcasters would even discuss
reasonable requests from individuals or groups seeking to present their
views. In recent congressional hearings, several groups testified that, if not
for the Fairness Doctrine, they would not have been granted access to broad-
casting facilities.9 3 The Fairness Doctrine has thus served well to ensure
that a broadcaster presents "those views and voices which are representative
of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from
the airwaves." 94
The free speech of individuals outside the press is also central to the right
89. As was noted earlier, the Commission allows broadcasters substantial discretion in
determining how to comply with the Fairness Doctrine. See supra note 25.
90. See, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 222 (1970) (licensees "must
present representative community views and voices on controversial issues," and a policy of
"excluding partisan voices and always itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive manner" is
inconsistent with the public interest) (emphasis added). See also Cullman, 40 F.C.C.2d at 577
(where licensee permits use of its facilities for expression of one viewpoint on a controversial
issue, reasonable opportunities must be afforded for "presentation of contrasting views by
spokesmen for other responsible groups").
The Supreme Court has also recognized that fairness obligations should be met in part by
allowing speakers to air their views directly. In CBS v. DNC, the Court, while reversing a
lower court holding that the first amendment required broadcasters to sell advertising time to
individuals and groups, nonetheless cited with approval Commission statements that broad-
casters should provide such opportunities. 412 U.S. at 130-32. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392
n. 18 (emphasizing the need for expression of opposing views by persons who actually believe
them).
91. See generally F. ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE PRACTICE PROSPECTS
71-88 (1984).
92. Andrew Schwartzman, executive director of the Medial Access Project, has stated
that "most of the dealings with the Fairness Doctrine are informal, the more informal the
better so that local groups get to establish an ongoing relationship with the news people of the
local station." F. ROWAN, supra note 91, at 72.
93. Freedom of Expression Act Hearings, supra note 59, at 101-04, 131-42.
94. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
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of freedom of expression under the first amendment. As Justice Brennan
observed in CBS v. Democratic National Committee:
[T]he First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the
right of the public to hear debate, but also the right of individuals
to participate in that debate and to attempt to persuade others to
their points of view. And, in a time of apparently growing ano-
nymity of the individual in our society, it is imperative that we take
special care to preserve the vital First Amendment interest in as-
suring 'self-fulfillment' [of expression] for each individual. For our
citizens may now find greater than ever the need to express their
own views directly to the public, rather than through a governmen-
tally appointed surrogate, if they are to feel that they can achieve
at least some measure of control over their own destinies.95
Fostering individual speech by guaranteeing access to broadcast media not
only lends dignity and provides fulfillment to the individual,96 but also
serves society by adding new, and potentially important, views to social dis-
course. Society derives an even more clear and direct benefit from affording
opportunities to political candidates. As the Supreme Court stated in CBS v.
FCC, "it is of particular importance that candidates have the. . . opportu-
nity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently eval-
uate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public
issues before choosing among them on election day."9 7
The first amendment rights of the public and speakers outside the media
justify the responsibilities of broadcasters as trustees for the public. Critics
of the rules nonetheless argue that the broadcast industry is the same as the
print industry, and hence, the government must, under the first amendment,
treat both industries the same. Broadcast stations, they argue, often out-
number newspapers, which remain unregulated.98 These critics, however,
have improperly identified the relevant market for comparison as simply
newspapers, rather than the print media as a whole. In any given locality,
an individual has access to hundreds, if not thousands,99 of newspapers,
95. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
96. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 80, § 12-1, at 578.
97. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 396 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976)).
98. See, e.g., FCC Asks End of Fairness Doctrine, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1981, at C36, col.
1 (quoting Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC: "The scarcity-of-media-access argument is
a bankrupt one. It is about time that media got the same rights to select material as newspa-
pers, book publishers and others."). See also Note, The Fairness Doctrine: Fair to Whom?, 30
Cleve. St. L. Rev. 485, 519-21 & n. 196 (1981) (advocating repeal of the Fairness Doctrine).
See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 207 (1982) (proposing deregulation of commercial broadcasting).
99. Over 9,000 newspapers, including dailies, weeklies and semiweeklies, and nearly
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magazines, and newsletters, not to mention an unlimited number of books.
By comparison, broadcast outlets remain relatively scarce.'l° New technol-
ogies have not alleviated this scarcity. "0 Even if new technologies do reduce
the scarcity of electronic outlets, the crucial importance of broadcasting in
our national dialogue places the fairness rules beyond constitutional
challenge. 10
2
Simple analogies to newspapers notwithstanding, the first amendment
does not, and should not, absolutely protect broadcasters from intervention
that vindicates the broader public interest. As Justice Jackson observed,
"[tihe moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the
sound track, the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses
and dangers. Each .. . is a law unto itself.' 0 3 The nationwide reach of
network broadcasting magnifies the dangers of private monopolization of the
marketplace of ideas. Since government must allocate broadcast frequen-
11,000 periodicals are published in the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 564 (104th ed. 1983).
100. A recent House Report provided the following figures on television availability:
Number of Stations Percent of TV Households
1 or 2 7.93%
3 29.17%
4 21.25%
5/more 40.51%
REPORT BY THE MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CON-
SUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE, OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION 345 (1981) (1977 data).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. In CBS v. FCC, the court upheld the rea-
sonable access provisions of the Communications Act without mentioning scarcity. Instead, in
rejecting a first amendment challenge, the court noted that the airwaves were an "important
resource" which Congress was attempting to insure would be used in the public interest. 453
U.S. at 397. The Court also emphasized that the provision enhanced freedom of expression by
protecting the rights of the public to receive information, and the rights of candidates to speak.
Id. at 396. Since similar rights are also protected by the Fairness Doctrine, see supra text
accompanying notes 81-96, the opinion indicates that it, too, is constitutional regardless of
scarcity.
103. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Jackson argued
that merely because a particular form of control was appropriate for speech in one context, in
this case a sound truck, it would not necessarily be valid if applied to speech in other forms
and contexts.). See Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)
("[e]ach medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
standards suited to it"); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386 ("differences in the characteristics of news
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them"). See, e.g., Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (regulation of billboards); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state "rights of reply" statute in con-
text of a newspaper); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (prior screening of movies by
state censor board); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (regulation of loudspeakers).
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cies, 1° broadcasting presents the government with a unique opportunity to
minimize these risks, and affirmatively foster freedom of expression for indi-
viduals and the public at large. The FCC and Congress, through the fairness
rules, have taken full advantage of this opportunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The passage of time has not made the wisdom of the Red Lion decision
obsolete. Regulation is still needed to ensure that the public has access to
competing views on important issues. The electronic media will continue to
be dominated by a few voices for the foreseeable future. The rise of political
action committees presents a new and serious threat to balanced discussion.
Creative use of the fairness rules by individuals and groups outside the me-
dia to gain access to broadcast facilities further strengthens the case for the
rules.
The fairness rules remain our least intrusive means of guaranteeing ac-
countability, responsibility, and diversity in our most important medium of
mass communications. The Fairness Doctrine and political broadcasting
rules are thus important symbols not only of our society's commitment to
full and fair debate, but also of our commitment to freedom of expression for
all individuals and groups. In a perfect world, a marketplace free of govern-
mental involvement might provide opportunities for all to speak, and allow
all important viewpoints to be heard. If new technologies or changed cir-
cumstances at some point bring this possibility closer to reality, governmen-
tal intervention in general and the fairness rules in particular may become
anachronisms. For the present, and for the foreseeable future, however,
these rules cannot be abandoned without leaving the "marketplace of ideas"
in the hands of the few and the powerful.
104. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
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